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Purpose of Thesis 10q? 
This discussion of the crime problem and the possible P3:t "', I 
solutions focuses on two main theories: the deterrence 
hypothesis and the rehabilitation hypothesis. The deterrence 
hypothesis states that an increase in expected punishment causes 
a significant decrease in crime. It also suggests that 
individuals respond significantly to the deterring incentives 
created by the criminal justice system (Cooter and Ulen 524). 
Examples of these incentives include prison or fines. The 
rehabilitation hypothesis states crime is reduced by devoting 
resources to job-creation, income maintenance, family counseling, 
mental health, and other programs designed to alleviate social, 
economic, and biological causes of crime (Cooter and Ulen 413). 
Both theories are discussed and weighed as to their costs and 
benefits. The costs and benefits of each theory are explored 
on both the effects of society and the offender. Each theory 
is also explored as to whether efficiency is the key to the 
crime problem or if there is something deeper that is also 
involved. Although each of the two main theories deal with 
different issues, they share a common goal: a solution to the 
crime problem. Since they share this goal, it could be said 
that both approaches are not mutually exclusive and the optimal 
public policy for reducing crime is a mix of the two. The two 
should be mixed until the marginal productivity of a dollar 
spent on deterrence equals the marginal productivity of a dollar 
spend on rehabilitation. 
-There are two basic hypotheses to solving the crime problem: 
the deterrence hypothesis and the rehabilitation hypothesis. 
The deterrence hypothesis states that an increase in expected 
punishment would cause a significant decrease in crime. The 
deterrence hypothesis also suggests individuals respond more 
to deterring incentives such as incarceration and fines. 
However, the rehabilitation hypothesis assumes crime is a result 
of a complex set of socioeconomic or biological factors that 
would be more affected by education or rehabilitation such as 
teaching the prisoners a marketable job skill or providing 
religious instruction (Cooter and Ulen 413). The rehabilitation 
hypothesis also focuses on reducing crime by devoting resources 
to job-creation, income maintenance, family counseling, mental 
health, and other programs designed to alleviate social, 
economic, and biological causes of crime (Cooter and Ulen 413). 
The major question in solving the crime problem is whether 
the economic solution to crime ignores the possible solution 
of rehabilitation or other non-institutional alternatives. 
But what would happen if these theories were not mutually 
exclusive. What if a solution could be found that takes into 
account both job-related variables (such as the rate of 
unemployment, labor force participation, and education) and 
sanctioning variables (such as increasing the severity and/or 
probability of punishment). 
The two alternative solutions can be divided into four 
basic ways to correct the crime problem: increase resources 
for crime prevention, incarcerate criminals during the most 
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crime intensive years, increase the legitimate opportunities 
for the less skilled, or increase the penalty for crime. When 
looking at an optimal crime control policy and these basic 
corrective measures, two sets of incentives that motivate 
potential or actual criminals must be analyzed. These incentives 
are divided into two categories: negative and positive. 
Negative incentives deter or prevent the potential or actual 
criminal from entering or actively pursuing illegitimate 
activities (Ehrlich 44). Negative incentives fall under the 
deterrence hypothesis. Positive incentives induce participation 
in legitimate employment and earnings opportunities, 
rehabilitation programs, and a reduction in the disparity in 
the distribution of income in society (Ehrlich 44). Positive 
incentives would fall under the rehabilitation hypothesis. 
These incentives are not mutually exclusive. A solution just 
needs to be found that efficiently combines the corrective 
measures. 
However, neither solution would lead to a decrease in the 
supply of offenses if criminals were not at least a little 
rational. Criminals commit crimes because they believe they 
will gain more from criminal activity or they will run a smaller 
risk of punishment than usually is true. Criminals also tend 
to act contrary to their own long term interests which is 
referred to as temporal inconsistency (Wilson & Abrahamse 360). 
Temporal inconsistency causes criminal to overvalue the benefits 
of crime while undervaluing the costs (372). Criminals act 
this way because the benefits of crime often occur simultaneously 
----
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with or shortly after committing the crime, while the costs 
might not occur for many months if at all (373). Career 
criminals commit crime because they "discount punishment for 
uncertainty and futurity more highly than other people" (Cooter 
and Ulen 417). 
Criminals look at the expected benefits of a criminal act 
in comparison to a certain income provided by legal activities. 
In order for a criminal to refrain from criminal activities, 
legal activities must provide the most benefit. The monetary 
gain of crime depends upon: legitimate earnings opportunities, 
criminal earnings opportunities, likelihood crime will succeed, 
and the penalty of the crime if caught (Freeman 31). Since 
the reduction of the amount of criminal activity depends on 
the benefit or punishment to the criminal, the expected benefit 
from criminal activities should decrease or the opportunity 
costs of crime (income from legal activities) should increase 
in order to solve the crime problem. The rational criminal 
will compare the benefit of the crime with the assessment of 
the punishment, and if the punishment is less than the benefit, 
the individual will commit the act (Phillips and Votey 20). 
Even if the end result is uncertain a rational person will still 
respond to the difference between the expected reward and the 
expected punishment (21). 
Now that it has been discussed why criminals commit crime, 
the focus will shift to how criminals can be prevented from 
committing crime. First, the deterrence hypothesis will be 
analyzed. The deterrence hypothesis states that an increase 
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in expected punishment causes a significant decrease in crime. 
It also suggests that individuals respond significantly to 
deterring incentives created by the criminal justice system. 
Deterring incentives would include increasing the severity or 
probability of punishment either through incarceration or fines. 
By imprisoning criminals, four major social benefits can arise 
(Cooter and Ulen 419). The first social benefit would be 
retribution. Retribution imprisons criminals in proportion 
to the crime committed while serving society's desire to do 
justice. The length of the sentence is varied until it is in 
proportion to the shame and personal cost of imprisonment. 
The second social benefit would be deterrence which uses 
imprisonment to deter criminals from committing crimes in the 
future. Another social benefit would be rehabilitation. 
Rehabilitation allows criminals to participate in programs that 
reduce the chance they will return to crime once released. 
Examples of rehabilitation include teaching the prisoners a 
marketable job skill or providing religious instruction. The 
final benefit would be incapacitation which occurs by isolating 
criminals from society so they cannot commit crimes against 
anyone but each other (Cooter and Ulen 419). 
Before discussing the costs of the deterrence hypothesis, 
the conditions that must hold for incarceration to be effective 
and reduce crime rates will be discussed. First, incapacitated 
criminals cannot be immediately replaced by new criminals because 
incapacitation is most effective when the supply of criminals 
is inelastic (Cooter and Ulen 420). This simply means that 
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once a criminal is imprisoned a new criminal cannot take his 
place or incarceration would not have an effect on the crime 
rate. Second, incarceration must reduce the total number of 
crimes repeat offenders commit over their entire criminal career. 
This condition implies that in order to reduce crime rates, 
recidivism cannot occur. Unfortunately, incarceration only 
effects the timing of crimes for some offenders. Incapacitation 
has no effect if a criminal commits crimes until the expected 
punishment exceeds the benefit (420). 
There are also several costs related to the deterrence 
hypothesis. First, the costs of construction, maintenance, 
and operating costs of prisons needed to hold the criminals. 
Secondly, the opportunity cost of losing the productivity of 
~ the imprisoned criminal (See Appendix C). Next, unlike a fine, 
imprisonment does not generate a benefit to the state. Also, 
the cost of the decline of an offender's skills and the loss 
of their legitimate employment contacts after release (Posner 
227). Because the purpose of imprisonment is to punish and/or 
incapacitate the criminal this forces prisoners to return to 
society with their labor market skills and opportunities 
decreased and their criminal skills and opportunities enhanced 
(Freeman 27). Another cost could be the long term effect of 
imprisonment which is the health care costs associated with 
the geriatric inmate (Cooter and Ulen 420). Imprisonment uproots 
criminals from their networks of social relationships (family, 
friends, workmates) and deprives them of the choice of 
companions. Prisons are also being revealed as places that 
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-- cause physchological deformation, loss of self-esteem and 
initiative, and depersonalization (Rotman 144). 
Another deterring incentive would be fines. Fines are 
an available option that, unlike imprisonment, generate revenue 
for the state (Posner 227). According to Posner, the social 
cost of collecting fines from solvent defendants is less than 
the social cost of imprisonment (227). Fines in the United 
states are fixed per offense with a statutory maximum and 
independent of the criminal's income (Cooter and Ulen 421). 
According to Becker, fines should be used as the main form of 
punishment and the amount of the fine should be equal to the 
damage inflicted (Pyle 95). Fines have two major advantages. 
Fines inflict minimal social costs. Also, the revenue earned 
could be used to compensate victims for the damage inflicted. 
Unfortunately fines favor the rich and they are not always 
feasible for some crimes. In order to make fines more effective 
as an alternatives to imprisonment several improvements have 
been suggested: make fines payable in installments, make fines 
proportionate to and payable out of earnings, or impose heavy 
nonpecuniary sanction as an alternative (Posner 228). 
Imprisonment and fines both involve an opportunity cost and 
a marginal cost. As with any crime, a rational individual will 
pursue the activity until the marginal cost of participating 
in the activity is equal to the marginal benefit derived from 
it (Pyle 95). According to Posner there is a down side to fines. 
Posner states, "since the foregone income from lawful employment 
is an opportunity cost of crime, a reduction in the offenders 
Rayburn 8 
lawful earnings prospects reduces the cost of criminal activity 
to him and thereby increases the likelihood he will commit crimes 
(227). 
The economic solution to crime involves an optimal level 
of punishment (whether it is incarceration or fines) for the 
purpose of deterrence. It is possible to eliminate, or nearly 
eliminate, crime by severely imposing a high probable punishment 
upon offenders (Cooter and Ulen 536). Unfortunately, this method 
involves two difficulties. First, extremely severe penalties 
may violate moral and constitutional rights of criminal (like 
capital punishment for shoplifting a loaf of bread). Second, 
the cost of apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing criminals 
is expensive. The solution to the crime problem involves 
-- balancing the cost against the advantages of reducing crime 
when making policy decisions. This balance has two aspects. 
First, policymakers should determine a target for the total 
amount of deterrence keeping in mind that the optimal amount 
is not to completely eradicate crime. Crime should not be 
completely eradicated because that is too costly and has a 
declining social benefit. Second, policymakers need to allocate 
their limited resources to achieve the deterrence target at 
the least cost to achieve their goal efficiently (Cooter and 
Ulen 536). These ideas match the approach of maximizing output 
for a given expenditure on inputs discussed earlier, so it can 
be concluded that the two alternative solutions to the crime 
problem are not mutually exclusive. 
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Prison can lower the 'overall life prospects' for some 
criminals while at the same time increasing the 'future well 
being' of others through the use of rehabilitation (Cooter and 
Ulen 420). This statement leads into the second theory, the 
rehabilitation hypothesis. Edgardo Rotman defines rehabilitation 
as "a right to an opportunity to return to (or remain in) society 
with an improved chance of being a useful citizen and staying 
out of prison" (3). Rehabilitation in prisons can involve: 
educational opportunities, vocational training, medical or 
psychological treatment, maintenance of family and community 
connections, safe and healthy prison environment, post-release 
support, and elimination of hindrances for re-entry into the 
community (Rotman 3). Rotman sees rehabilitation as the goal 
of a correctional institution to work to minimize the harms 
of incarceration (11). Using rehabilitation allows consideration 
to be given to subjectivity by enlarging the scope of the legal 
system to include the future life of the criminal in the 
community when sentencing and during correctional phases (2). 
There are several methods of rehabilitation (See Appendix A) 
which include: psychotherapies, guided group interactions, 
alternative schools and foster care for juveniles, family 
therapy, day treatment programs, pretrial release and diversion 
programs, work release and pre-release programs, restitution 
programs, and various community assistance programs (4). 
Criticism of rehabilitation can be divided into three 
categories: (1) abuses committed in the name of rehabilitation 




incarceration based on rehabilitative considerations, (2) demand 
for punishment, (3) alleged ineffectiveness of rehabilitation 
programs (Rotman 101). According to Rotman, rehabilitative 
programs can be effective in preventing crime or reducing 
recidivism if they are carried out by competent, qualified 
individuals to suitable target populations (133). 
Rehabilitation has several benefits. It prevents human 
deterioration, keeps punishment within its legal and 
constitutional limits, and it becomes a prisoner's right that 
reinforces all others (Rotman 144). It also provides a social 
learning environment which helps to counteract the 
depersonalizing effect of an institution, strengthens social 
connections with inmates, creates within the institution a 
society of mutual cooperation that resembles life on the outside 
(144). Rehabilitation includes the search for non-institutional 
alternatives. According to Rotman, these alternatives include: 
probation, suspended sentence, community service and restitution, 
diversion, electronic surveillance, and community corrections 
for juveniles (See Appendix B). 
When finding a solution to the crime problem the common 
solution is seen as an all or nothing answer. The solution 
is normally seen as one choice or the other (for example, 
deterrence or education). In this illustration the term 
legitimate activity award is used to describe rehabilitative 
measures such as education, labor force participation, or 
counseling. To illustrate this approach suppose a 5% increase 
in legitimate activity rewards (education, labor force 
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participation) would cause a 2% decrease in the supply of 
offenses. This increase in legitimate activity rewards would 
cost $200,000. Now suppose on the other hand, a 3% increase 
in expected punishment (severity/probability) would lead to 
a 2% decreasE~ in the supply of offenses. This increase in 
expected punishment would cost only $150,000. While both 
approaches lead to a 2% decrease in the supply of offenses, 
the legitimate activity reward alternative cost $50,000 more. 
However, the theory of diminishing marginal returns shifts the 
focus of the crime problem to an allocation of alternatives. 
So the most E~fficient solution would be to allocate public 
spending between legitimate activity awards (in this example 
education will be used) and deterrence such that the marginal 
productivity of a dollar spent on deterrence equals the marginal 
productivity of a dollar spent on education. The solution can 
be a total allocation of fixed funds that involves some 
expenditure in each project. 
When finding an efficient approach to the crime problem, 
the solution must involve maximizing output for a given 
expenditure on inputs. In order to maximize output for a given 
expenditure on inputs, the government should always choose to 
operate at a point of tangency between an isocost and an isoquant 
(Landsburg 145). In the example above the isocost is the fixed 
amount of public spending available, and the isoquant is the 
reduction in offenses. Efficiency requires the criminal justice 
system to find the point on the isoquant at which the level 
of deterrence is achieved at the least cost (Cooter and Ulen 
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.- 541). This point is represented by point A which is shown on 
the included graph (see Exhibit 1). So these two theories are 
not mutually exclusive because the solution lies in the tradeoff 
between the alternatives. 
In seeking a solution to the crime problem the two 
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive because the key goal of 
correctional intervention (whether imprisonment or 
rehabilitation) is to minimize crime including recidivism (Gray 
569). An optimal public policy for reducing crime would be 
to mix the alternatives until the marginal dollar best spent 
is reached. Unfortunately, public debate considers these two 
hypothesis to be mutually exclusive, although both can be correct 
because of the many variables that lead to crime (Cooter and 
Ulen 413). Economically speaking, the way to minimize crime 
would be to charge more to those who value criminal activity 
most (Pyle 28). This could be achieved under the deterrence 
hypothesis by two basic methods: increase the probability 
of punishment or increase the severity of punishment. Although 
these choices might reduce crime immediately, what happens when 
criminals are placed back into society after serving their 
sentences in prisons that are highly criminogenic. without 
some form of rehabilitation these criminals will just return 
to society with decreased legitimate employment skills. So 
when responding to crime, justification cannot be given to a 
solution that may be efficient but fails to protect the rights 
of the criminals. Despite the harmful and reprehensible criminal 
activities offenders commit, the punishment should be humane 
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enough to give criminals a chance to redeem themselves to society 
and become a useful component in the economy. In the absence 
of strong alternatives to imprisonment, increased reliance on 
incarceration would appear to be an effective approach to 
reducing crime. However, alternatives to imprisonment do exist. 
"Prevention or rehabilitation is preferable to long-term 
incarceration from both a cost-benefit and humanitarian 
perspective" (Levitt 348). According to Rotman, "rehabilitation 
does not oppose the measure of deterrence inherent in criminal 
punishment, but strives to maintain punishment within the limits 
of a pre-existing law, counteracting its unwarranted 
consequences" (183). Unfortunately the solution to the crime 
problem is not an either/or choice because neither alternative 
provides all the answers. By focusing on the strengths of each 
alternative an efficient solution can be found that takes into 
account society and the offender. An efficient and humane 
solution does exist to the crime problem. This solution lies 
not in one specific alternative, but in a combination of methods 
which leads to an optimal trade-off between costs and benefits, 
and society and the offender. The solution lies in allocating 
public spending between legitimate activity awards and deterrence 
so the marginal productivity on a dollar spent on deterrence 





Exhibit 1 Minimizing the crime rate with a given nwnetary allocation of public spending 
SF 
so 
SE = Amount spent on Education 
SD = Amount spent on Deterrence 
Point A represents the level of deterrence that can be achieved at the lowest cost 
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Fines as an Alternative to Incarceration 
Fines are an available option that, unlike imprisonment, 
generate revenue for the state (Posner 227). According to 
Posner, the social cost of collecting fines from solvent 
defendants is less than the social cost of imprisonment (227). 
Fines in the United states are fixed per offense with a statutory 
maximum and independent of the criminal's income (Cooter and 
Ulen 421). According to Becker, fines should be used as the 
main form of punishment and the amount of the fine should be 
equal to the damage inflicted (Pyle 95). Fines have two major 
advantages. Fines inflict minimal social costs. Also the 
revenue earned could be used to compensate victims for the damage 
-- inflicted. Unfortunately fines favor the rich and they are 
not always feasible for some crimes. In order to make fines 
more effective as an alternative to imprisonment several 
improvements have been suggested: make fines payable in 
installments, make fines proportionate to and payable out of 
earnings, or impose heavy nonpecuniary sanction as an alternative 
(Posner 228). Imprisonment and fines both involve an opportunity 
cost and a marginal cost. As with any crime, a rational 
individual will pursue the activity until the marginal cost 
of participating in the activity is equal to the marginal benefit 
derived from it (Pyle 95). According to Posner there is a down 
side to fines. Posner states, "since the foregone income from 
lawful employment is an opportunity cost of crime, a reduction 
in the offenders lawful earnings prospects reduces the cost 
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of criminal activity to him and thereby increases the likelihood 
he will commit crimes (227). 
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Rehabilitation Involving Juveniles 
When discussing juveniles and rehabilitation it has been 
found that the most effective way to reform delinquent youth 
is to involve community support in their rehabilitation. 
Rehabilitation can be in the form of education and socialization. 
Organizations like CREST (Clinical Regional Support Teams) and 
the Michigan Behavioral-Employment Intervention Program have 
been proven to be effective. CREST uses a nonauthoritarian 
counseling approach instead of the usual threat of sanctions 
to obtain compliance from the offenders. The Michigan 
Behavioral-Employment Intervention Program implemented a 
successful job employment program. It achieved this success 
by ensuring motivation and a positive attitude from both 
offenders and employers (Rotman 168). 
Because of the high concentration of crime being committed 
by youth it is necessary to focus on this issue. The majority 
of the youth involved in crime are school failures. If this 
is true, education could be the "antidote" to the problem of 
delinquency which would solve the crime problem before it could 
get started. School is increasing in importance and influence 
in the lives of adolescents because of the decline in organized 
religion, the close communities, and extended family networks 
of many working class people. Intervention through school can 
occur early and it is preventive unlike the enforcement of 
ineffective "cures" later on in life. Education teaches habits 
of restraint, punctuality, discipline, and obedience (Tutt 25). 
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-- There are four main features of a school that may inadvertently 
generate delinquency: rigid streaming by ability, high rates 
of corporal punishment, high staff turnover, and custodial or 
authoritarian school climate. A rigid streaming of ability occurs 
when good students are pitted against the so called bad students. 
High rates of physical punishment within a school have repeatedly 
been reported as a causal factor in delinquency. Extensive 
use of physical punishment by teachers could be imitated by 
the students. A high rate of staff turnover makes it difficult 
for the students to identify with the staff. Also the 'tone' 
of a school effects student delinquency, vandalism, and academic 
factors (Tutt 41). 
Among juveniles, especially in community settings with 
serious crime or unemployment issues, crime leads to 
unemployment (Hagan 465). This occurs because early employment 
contacts are not formed because of the youths participation 
in criminal activities. The juvenile's involvement in the 
criminal justice system engages them in court appearances and 
possible confinement instead of striving to achieve occupational 
goals that schools emphasize. The juveniles are removed from 
any possible job referral networks school might have provided 
and instead placed in prisons where the only networks are based 
on crime and further isolate them from legitimate employment 
opportunities (Hagan 465). According to Britt the connection 
between employment and juveniles can be explained by the 
motivational perspective. Under this theory, juveniles become 
frustrated because they cannot obtain or maintain employment 
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yet they want to improve their standard of living, so they turn 
to criminal activity (Britt 100). This motivational perspective 
explains why juveniles respond substantially to the economic 
return of crime (Freeman 36). Some juveniles combine crime 
and work in order to supplement low wage or unsatisfactory work, 
as an option to riskier illegal work, or to expand markets for 
sellers of illegal goods or services (Freeman 35). 
Diversion has influenced the development of measures for 
dealing with juvenile delinquents. Diversions can be categorized 
into four separate kinds: community absorption, screening, 
pre-trial diversion, and alternatives to institutions. Community 
absorption involves schools, families, or special designed 
clinics. Special designed clinics are used to deal informally 
and internally with the difficult children who have specific 
difficulties such as school phobia or mental illness. Screening 
occurs when the police refer an incident back to the family 
and simply drop the case instead of press criminal charges. 
Pre-trial diversion is dealing with juvenile offenders who have 
already been charged with a crime by settlement or mediation. 
This settlement or mediation takes place outside the normal 
criminal or juvenile justice system. Alternatives to 
institutions are the increase use of community measures such 
as restitution, probation, and community service instead of 
imprisonment (Tutt 45). 
Diversion has several advantages. It provides an earlier 
opportunity to work with the defendants. The labeling theory 
is avoided. The labeling theory states that the process of 
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arrest, trial, and conviction change the self-image of a 
juvenile. The juvenile sees himself as a deliquent therefore 
he feels as if he should act like a deliquent. Diversion also 
avoids the differential association theory which suggests that 
criminal behavior occurs when individuals have increased contact 
with those individuals who have deliquent attitudes. Finally, 
diversion saves scarce resources (Tutt 47). 
There are also several possible disadvantages to diversion. 
Diversion could be a less effective deterrent than a court 
appearance. Diversion might involve discriminatory practices. 
There is also a greater possibility that diversion will interfere 
with an offender's liberty. Diversion might lead to the 
application of pressure on children and parents to admit guilt 
in order to participate in the diversion program. There is 
also the possible extension rather than limitation of the network 
of social control. Finally, insufficient weights may not be 
given to the victim (Tutt 47). 
Success of diversion does not necessarily reduce the 
recidivism rate. Diversion success should also be measured 
by the effect it has on the penal system. Diversion can effect 
the penal system by keeping individuals out of prison, saving 
money or spending it better, or by the degree of public 
acceptance of a sanction that is based more on constructive 
principles like learning, reparation, and reconciliation instead 
of repression (Tutt 186). To make diversion a success the 
central and local government should encourage and pay closer 
attention to the voluntary organizations working with offenders. 
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voluntary agencies would probably be more successful in dealing 
with diversion because of their increased freedom and flexibility 
in determining how services are delivered. Voluntary agencies 
also have the benefit of being relatively unconfined by the 
slow bureaucracy of many statutory agencies (Tutt 209). 
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Further Discussion of the Opportunity Cost of 
Lost Productivity 
It is hard to estimate the opportunity cost of lost 
productivity because many incarcerated criminals enter prison 
with poor work records, a welfare dependency, and the government 
is already paying for their health care. 
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger proposed a solution 
to the problem of lost productivity. His proposal was to 
implement 'factories with fences'. The purpose of 'factories 
with fences' was to allow private industry to hire prisoners 
to produce marketable goods while in the confines of the prison. 
One example of this was at the Attica state Prison in New York. 
Prisoners were hired to manufacturer file cabinets in the prison 
metal shop. Also, a private, nonprofit organization in Minnesota, 
Stillwater Data Processing, hired prisoners of a maximum security 
prison as computer programmers. While these examples were 
profitable, there are a few legal obstacles. Federal law 
prohibits transportation of prison manufactured goods in 
interstate commerce. Also, certain 'state use' statutes prohibit 
the sale of products manufactured in prison. Although states 
are beginning to repeal this statute (Cooter and Ulen 421). 
-.-
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